The main portion of the army had been organized into three corps, designated the First, Second, and Third, under McCook, Crittenden, and Gilbert, respectively. General Sill, in command of two divisions, was ordered to move on the left toward Frankfort, to hold in check the force of the enemy under Kirby Smith at that place. The other columns marched by different routes upon r converging upon Bardstown, through Shepardsville, Mount Washington, Fairfield, and Bloomfield. Each column engaged the enemy's cavalry and artillery in a series of skirmishes from within a short distance of Louisville. As the army approached Bardstown the resistance constantly increased, retarding Buell's advance, and enabling Bragg to effect his withdrawal from that place, which was accomplished eight hours before the arrival of Buell's army. A sharp cavalry engagement occurred at this place between Buell's advance and Bragg's rear-guard, when the whole of Bragg's command retired, taking the rto Springfield. At Bardstown Buell received information that a junction of Bragg's and Kirby Smith's commands would be made at Danville. He ordered McCook to advance from Bloomfield on the Harrodsburg r and directed Thomas to move with Crittenden's corps on the Lebanon r which passes four miles south of Perryville, with a branch to the latter place, while he accompanied Gilbert's corps, which moved on the direct rto Perryville. After leaving Bardstown, Buell learned that Kirby Smith's force had crossed to the west side of the Kentucky River, near Salvisa, and that Bragg was concentrating either at Harrodsburg or Perryville. He at once ordered McCook to change his line of march from the former r and to proceed direct to Perryville. On the afternoon of October 7th, Buell, with Gilbert's corps, arrived in front of the rebels in strong force three miles from Perryville, where he immediately drew his troops up in line of battle. Advancing the cavalry and artillery, supported by two regiments of infantry, the rear guard of the enemy was pressed to within two miles of the town, when it was discovered that the rebels were concentrating for battle. Orders were sent by Buell to Crittenden and McCook to march at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 8th, and for them to take position as early as possible on the left and right of the centre corps respectively, the commanders themselves to report in person their arrival, for orders, the intention being to make the attack that day if possible.
McCook did not receive this order until 2.30 o'clock, and was on the march at five. Owing to the difficulty of finding water for his command where the troops were expected to encamp, Thomas, on the night of the 7th, moved off the direct line of march some six miles and was delayed several hours in reaching his position on the field. During the night some pools of water were discovered in small creek about two miles and a half from Perryville. Colonel Dan McCook with the Thirty-sixth Brigade was ordered forward, and, after a sharp engagement, secured possession of the pools, and a supply of bad water for Gilbert's troops was obtained.
On October 1st, Bragg, leaving Polk in command at Bardstown, under orders to slowly retire to Bryantsville, started for Lexington. Here he ordered Kirby Smith with all his forces to Frankfort, to assist in the installation services of the rebel Provisional Governor of Kentucky at the capital of the State. At Lexington, on the 2d, learning of Buell's movements from Louisville, Bragg ordered Polk in writing--sending two copies to him--to advance at once, "with his whole available force, by way of Bloomfield, toward Frankfort, to strike the enemy in the flank and rear." Polk was informed in the order that Kirby Smith would at the same time attack the front.
On the 3d, Polk received the orders, and, submitting them to a council of war, decided not to obey them, but to move as originally ordered. Of this Bragg was notified in time to prevent the attack on Buell's front with Smith's command alone. Giving orders for the supplies that had been accumulated in Lexington to be sent to Bryantsville, Bragg, on the 6th, proceeded to Harrodsburg, where he met Polk at the head of his column that had left Bardstown on the 3d. On the 7th, Bragg ordered Polk to move Cheatham's division back to Perryville, and to proceed to that point himself, to attack the Federal force, immediately rout them, and move rapidly to join Kirby Smith. These orders were given under the impression that Buell's command was so separated that his right and left were sixty miles apart. Bragg also sent Wither's division to Kirby Smith at Frankfort, who reported himself threatened by a large force on his front--the troops under Sill.
Early on the morning of the 8th an attempt was made by the enemy to drive Colonel McCook from his position at the creek. He was supported by Mitchell's and Sheridan's divisions, who were ordered up and directed to hold the position until the entire army was prepared to attack. The assault was made with great spirit on Colonel McCook, but the enemy was handsomely repulsed. Buell anticipated an attack on Gilbert's corps in its isolated position in the early morning, but nothing occurred until after the arrival of McCook's corps on the Maxville r between 10 and 11 o'clock, when he at once formed his command, of Rousseau's and Jackson's division, in line of battle on the left of Gilbert, Rousseau on the right, and sent his cavalry to the front to make a reconnoissance toward Perryville. Thomas arrived and took position with Crittenden's corps about twelve o'clock.
On McCook getting his command into position, he reported to General Buell in person, who ordered him to send out a force to the Chaplin River, and find out the position of the enemy in his front. During McCook's absence Rousseau had advanced the right of his line a half mile to obtain a supply of water, for which the troops were suffering. On seeing this, the rebels opened a heavy fire with some twenty pieces of artillery. Rousseau moved his other troops to support his right, and, posting Simonson's and Loomis's batteries, returned the enemy's artillery fire.
When McCook returned to his command, seeing that a good position on high ground could be occupied by our troops on the left and front of Rousseau's new line and near the river, he at once sent skirmishers into the woods at that point, to find out if the enemy held the position. He also directed Jackson to form a new line of battle with his division nearer the stream, and sent the skirmishers forward to the river as soon as this was done, where they obtained the needed supply of water. On the formation of the new line, as no heavy force of the enemy had been encountered, McCook, at about half-past one o'clock, rode to the right of his line. About half an hour later, Hardee, in command of three divisions, under Cheatham, Buckner, and Anderson, some sixteen thousand strong, advanced to the attack on McCook, driving back the skirmishers, first striking those posted in the woods. McCook had formed his line of battle, with Rousseau's right near a barn on the right of the Maxville r extending to the left and across that ron a ridge through a cornfield to the woods where the skirmishers were. The right of Jackson's line was holding a wooded elevation, running off to the left in rear of Chaplin River, while his left, north of Maxville r was thrown back in a northwesterly direction, forming an obtuse angle, deflected about thirty degrees along broken heights from their centre and right, the point of the angle being near where the Maxville rcrosses Doctor's Creek. The enemy considered the key of McCook's position to be at this crossing, and directed their main attack on that point. McCook had posted Starkweather's brigade in the rear of the left as support to Jackson, with Stone's and Bush's batteries of Rousseau's division, and had placed Webster's brigade of Jackson's division in rear of Rousseau's line. The enemy opened the attack on the extreme left of the Federal force posted in the angle. This was a very strong position, by reason of the character of the ground, which enabled these troops to sweep their front with a heavy fire. The troops here were protected by being posted behind stone fences, and were supported by batteries in the rear. In the attack on the left Jackson was killed by the first fire. Terrill's troops--nearly all new--were driven back, and McCook's left turned. In falling back, Terrill endeavored to rally his command near the batteries posted in his rear. While gallantly doing so, he fell, mortally wounded, and died in a few hours. McCook sent to Sheridan, asking him to protect his right, and sent to Gilbert for reinforcements.
The advance of the enemy was checked by Starkweather's brigade, with Stone's and Bush's batteries, all well posted to meet the assault after Terrill's brigade had been driven back. The enemy made repeated assaults with fresh troops at this point, but was driven back each time with heavy loss until the troops and batteries were out of ammunition, when they fell back to the original line, and obtaining a supply renewed the fight.
On the right in Rousseau's front the enemy under Anderson made a vigorous charge on Lytle's and Harris's brigades, attacking in greatly superior numbers. They were however handsomely repulsed. After fighting until their ammunition was exhausted, these troops retired on the line with Starkweather's command. The rebels then pushing forward under heavy fire from their batteries drove Lytle's brigade from the new line. Sloan's battery getting into position opened on the rebels with canister and checked their advance. Colonel Gooding's brigade from Mitchell's division of Gilbert's corps, with Penney's Fifth Wisconsin Battery, was ordered up, and after a brisk engagement the enemy was driven back and the original line of battle reoccupied. Steedman's brigade of Schoepff's division also came up, and attacking the enemy aided in the final repulse.
When the heaviest attack was made on Rousseau the enemy assaulted Sheridan's division in the advanced position which he occupied after forcing back their line earlier in the day. He now withdrew his troops, and posting them in a more favorable position on the original line, opened on the rebels with heavy musketry fire and canister. The enemy pressing him very hard at this point, he called on Gilbert for support, who re-enforced him with Carlin's brigade from Mitchell's division. As the enemy moved forward in strong force to the attack, Carlin immediately ordered his troops to charge, which they did, and drove the rebels before them through Perryville, capturing in the town two caissons, fifteen wagons ld with ammunition, and a guard of 138 men under command of three officers. Sheridan also drove the enemy for some distance, but did not consider it prudent to advance too far, leaving McCook's right exposed. He then directed his artillery fire on the enemy at his left, and aided in checking the advance in that quarter. Wagner's brigade of Wood's division became engaged, and did good service on the right of Mitchell's division. The rest of Crittenden's corps was not engaged in the action. Thomas, on arriving on the battlefield with this corps, was directed to take position in the line of battle on the right and wait for orders. Here he waited during the entire day, and received none. Only part of Gilbert's corps was engaged in the fight, the heavy blow striking McCook's, which he failed to report to Buell until after two hours' fighting. The battle was closed by night coming on, and a general engagement was anticipated the next day. Thomas was directed to move Crittenden's and Gilbert's corps forward in the morning at six o'clock, and attack the enemy's front and left flank.
Buell ordered McCook during the night to close the opening between his right and Gilbert's left. His orders for the following day were to hold his position and take advantage of any opportunity that the events of the day might present, the main attack to be made by the other corps. On the following morning, the advance being made in accordance with these orders, it was discovered that the enemy's main body had retired during the night, and was falling back on Harrodsburg, with indications that he would there make a stand. Bragg left his dead and wounded on the field, but retired leisurely and in good order.
Buell reported the strength of his command before the engagement at 58,000 effective men. Of these he claimed 22,000 were raw troops, not drilled, and undisciplined. Less than one-half of this entire force was in the action. His reports show a loss of 4,348, being 916 killed, 2,943 wounded, and 489 missing. Nearly all the losses were from McCook's command, which bore the brunt of the heavy fighting. Bragg referring to his loss in his official report says: "In such a conflict our own loss was necessarily severe, probably not less than 2,500 killed, wounded, and missing." During the campaign General Buell captured nearly five thousand prisoners.
The enemy's troops engaged in the battle were under the immediate command of General Polk. Bragg had been with Kirby Smith at Frankfort, where these active operations found him engaged in superintending "the ceremony of installing the Provisional Governor into office."
In his official report of the battle of Perryville, made from Bryantsville, October 12, 1862, Bragg says: "After consulting with the General (Polk) and reconnoitering the ground and examining his dispositions, I declined to assume the command, but suggested some changes and modifications of his arrangements, which he promptly made." In a subsequent report of Perryville, made while he was at Shelbyville, of date May 20, 1863, he reflects very severely upon Polk's movements at Perryville. He says that he ordered the attack to be made by Polk on Gilbert early in the morning of the 8th, that he waited until 10 A.M., and hearing no firing started to see Polk and have an explanation of the delay. Here he was "informed that it was determined not to attack, but to assume the 'defensive offensive.'" Bragg gave orders for some changes in the line of battle, restoring certain portions of the command that had been withdrawn, and again ordering Polk to bring on the engagement. The execution of this order was delayed by Polk, and Bragg, becoming "impatient at the delay after this order," "despatched a staff officer to repeat it to the General, and soon thereafter followed in person and put the troops in motion."
Bragg's intention was not to fight a general engagement at Perryville, but merely to check the advance of Buell's army, thereby gaining time to gather his supplies and men together and leave the State. Bragg had been urged, by leading Kentuckians in his command and others, to undertake the campaign in Kentucky with the promise of immense numbers of recruits and large quantities of supplies. He anticipated that his coming would be hailed as that of a deliverer, and that the young men of the State would flock to his banners and fill up his army, so that he could attack Buell at any point. Bragg's entire command in Kentucky was estimated at thirty-five to forty thousand. He anticipated enlisting twenty thousand recruits, and took arms to Kentucky for that number of new troops. Buell's command, with his losses and the garrison at Nashville was less than this, but at Louisville he received some twenty-two thousand new troops. The number of infantry recruits for Bragg's army was very small, for he says in his first official report of the battle of Perryville--when he at that time was preparing to leave the State--"with ample means to arm twenty thousand men and a force with that to fully redeem the State, we have not yet issued half the arms left us by casualties incident to the campaign."
General Buell waited for Sill to join him with his division, leaving Dumont at Frankfort. On the march Sill's advance was attacked by a portion of Kirby Smith's command, which he repulsed and arrived at Perryville on the 11th. Buell then moved forward, expecting Bragg to give battle at Harrodsburg, and throwing out a strong force to reconnoitre, discovered the enemy in force some three miles south of that place. During the day Bragg continued his march south, his rear guard being driven out of the place with the loss of considerable stores and about twelve hundred prisoners, in the main sick and wounded. On the next day Buell made a strong reconnoissance to the crossing of Dick's River, and there ascertained that Bragg had crossed his entire army.
Learning on the 13th that the enemy was retreating south, Buell ordered pursuit to be made immediately, for the purpose of overtaking Bragg, or of intercepting him if he should attempt to pass toward Somerset. Wood's division marched at midnight, and engaged the enemy at Stanford at daylight the next morning. The rest of Crittenden's and McCook's corps followed on the same r Gilbert marching on the Lancaster r The enemy was steadily pressed on the rto Cumberland Gap, but could not be brought to an engagement. McCook's and Gilbert's corps were halted at Crab Orchard, while Crittenden, with W. S. Smith's division, was sent in pursuit as far as London on the direct rto the Gap. It now appearing that Bragg did not intend to fight in the State, and the country beyond Crab Orchard being extremely barren and rough--no supplies existing in it--the pursuit was discontinued, and the Army of the Ohio was turned toward Bowling Green and Glasgow, preparatory to the advance to Nashville. McCook's and Gilbert's corps were concentrated at the former place, and Crittenden's at the latter. This movement of the troops was made by Buell, who was confident that Bragg would concentrate in the vicinity of Nashville, and seek to recover that place, and to fight his great battle for the possession of Kentucky.
The military affairs of the nation at this time were unfortunately in charge of General Halleck, who had been called to Washington as Commander-in-Chief. On the retreat of Bragg from Kentucky, Halleck insisted that Buell should make a campaign into East Tennessee, a distance of two hundred and forty miles, over mountain and river, without any communication to the rear, except by wagon train, over almost impassable r, the advance to be made in the face of the enemy, who, operating on his line of communications could move his entire command to defeat our advance in detail. Buell reported to the War Department that it was impossible to make the campaign as ordered, and knowing the necessity of protecting Nashville, he directed the concentration of his troops on the line of the railrto that place. That rhad been repaired up to Bowling Green, after the destruction of two months before, and here the troops received their needed supplies. On the 30th of October, Buell was relieved of the command of the Department of the Ohio, and Major-General William S. Rosecrans was, by the direction of the General-in-Chief, assigned to the command of the troops. The designation of the command being changed to that of the Department of the Cumberland.
It is a somewhat singular fact, that the campaign in Kentucky should have caused the most intense feeling in the opposing armies against their respective commanders. In the Federal army, after Buell allowed Bragg to move north from Munfordville without an engagement, the expressions of the troops against their commanding general were open, bitter, and almost universal, from the lowest to the highest. However, there was one who never for a moment lost faith, soldierly trust, and esteem for his commander, and he was of all persons in the command most competent to judge. This was General Thomas. He knew the great difficulties of Buell's position, how his place had been interfered with by Halleck, under whose command it was his misfortune early in the year to be; and later, how he was made to feel the power of this same man as a personal matter. Halleck, invested by the Administration with supreme powers, planned a campaign into East Tennessee, on paper in Washington, and ordered Buell to execute it. This, the latter, with full knowledge of the situation, refused to do, and quietly ordering his troops to the line of the railrfrom whence they could be moved with the least delay, as needed, waited for the order he knew was pending for his removal.
General Buell was right in refusing to attack Bragg at Munfordville, or in fact at any time until he had placed his army north of the enemy, and received his own reinforcements from Louisville. Then this point was safe, and Nashville could not be imperiled by the defeat of our army. Buell made three dispositions for an engagement during the Kentucky campaign, but each time Bragg drew off except at Perryville, and here there was no design of the latter to fight, beyond checking Buell's advance, and gaining time for his troops to make their retreat from the State with all stores and material. Bragg, from his closing remarks in his first report of the battle of Perryville, certainly did not consider--so far as the Confederacy was concerned--that the State was worth fighting for. Had he received the 20,000 new troops he was promised, instead of General Buell having his army increased by that number, then he would have struck quick and sharp. He left the State deeply disgusted with Kentucky, and took every occasion after that to show it. The account was even, however, as Bragg was not a favorite in that State.
At Perryville Buell labored under the same disadvantage in the organization of his command that made itself felt on the first two great battlefields of the Army of the Cumberland. That was the inefficiency of his corps commanders. Of Gilbert it is only necessary to say, that a worse appointment as a corps commander was not made during the war. Fortunately, the battle of Perryville was his first and only appearance in that position. Buell, after expressing his thanks for McCook's services on that field and in the campaign, in his official report says: "It is true that only one serious battle has been fought, and that was incomplete, and less decisive than it might have been. That this was so is due partly to unavoidable difficulties which prevented the troops, marching on different r, from getting on the ground simultaneously, but more to the fact that I was not apprised early enough of the condition of affairs on my left. I can find no fault with the former, nor am I disposed at this time to censure the latter, though it must be admitted to have been a grave error. I ascribe it to the too great confidence of the general commanding the left corps (Major-General McCook), which made him believe that he could manage the difficulty without the aid or control of his commander." Buell was not notified of any attack by the enemy on his left until over two hours after the engagement was begun. He then hurried to the field, and sent the necessary supports forward, at once checking the enemy, and made disposition of his troops for battle.
With a willingness to lay down command that characterized all the commanders of the Army of the Cumberland when the authorities in Washington regarded the good of the service as requiring it, Buell placed the new commander in full possession of all plans and information that he possessed, and without a word left the troops that were to win undying fame on other battle-fields, largely by reason of the training he had given them during the period of his command, half a month less than one year.
The Comte de Paris, in his "History of the Civil War in America," in writing on the battle of Shiloh, where he refers to the massing of the artillery by Grant's Chief of Staff, Colonel Webster, says: "The fate of the day depends upon the preservation of these heights, whence the enemy could have commanded Pittsburg Landing," and on the following page adds, "Nevertheless, at the sight of the enemy's battalions advancing in good order, the soldiers that have been grouped together in haste, to give an air of support to Webster's battery, became frightened and scattered. It is about to be carried, when a new body of troops deploying in the rear of the guns, with as much regularity as if they were on the parade-ground, receives the Confederates with a fire that drives them back in disorder into the ravine. This was the brigade of Ammen, belonging to Nelson's division, that rushed forward so opportunely." In speaking of the second day's fight he says: "At a signal given by Buell, his three divisions, under Nelson, Crittenden, and McCook, put themselves in motion at the same time. The soldiers of the Army of the Ohio, constantly drilled for the year past by a rigid disciplinarian, and trained by their long marches across three States, are distinguished by their discipline and fine bearing. The readiness with which they march against the enemy wins the admiration of the generals, who, like Sherman, have had to fight a whole day at the head of raw and inexperienced troops."
The greatest service that General Buell rendered to his country was as the organizer and disciplinarian of the mass of the raw, undrilled troops that were hurried to the front under the need of the hour, and who, unaccustomed to military or other restraint, had all the freedom that characterizes the American sovereign both in speech and action. To take these troops by the thousands and make an army of fifty to seventy-five thousand trained skilled soldiers, who, in later days, were to do as splendid fighting as the world ever saw, was a stupendous undertaking. General Buell not only did this, but accomplished the task in time to bring some of these soldiers that he was justly proud of to the field of Shiloh, where, under his eye, they met the enemy like veterans. Buell's military training and habits of life led him, however, to one error. He was so good a soldier himself, that he failed to recognize the distinction between the regular soldier in garrison during times of peace and the thinking volunteer during the active campaigns of the rebellion. The latter could not and would not be made the mere machine the former becomes, and Buell's failure to appreciate this caused great ill-feeling against him at the time in his army. Then, again, Buell's earlier military training in the bureau office he held so many years unfitted him for the handling, on the battle-field, of the large number of troops which composed his command. But very few generals during the rebellion were able to successfully handle on the battle-field as large an army as was under Buell. In fact, the general who has sufficient talent as a good organizer and drill-master to enter into the details necessary to bring an army out of raw troops, has not the military genius required to handle a large army in fighting and winning great battles. But Buell rendered many valuable services, in the camp and on the field, to his country. It was Buell who planned the Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Nashville campaign, which Halleck put under his hat, and proceeded to carry out as HIS original idea, being careful to say nothing in regard to his plans until they were so far executed as to render any action on the part of Buell and his command simply that of a supporting column. Then to Buell is due the credit of the second day's fight at Shiloh. That day's battle was the fight of the Army of the Ohio with Lewis Wallace's division, General Grant giving Buell largely his discretion in the movements of the troops. Whitelaw Reid says of him, in "Ohio in the War," "He came into that action when, without him, all was lost. He redeemed the fortunes of the field, and justly won the title of the 'Hero of Pittsburg Landing.'"
The order placing Rosecrans in command--General Order No. 168, War Department, of date October 24, 1862--created the Department of the Cumberland, embracing that portion of the State of Tennessee lying east of the Tennessee River, and such portion of Georgia and Alabama as should be occupied by the Federal troops. The troops in the field were designated in the same order as the "Fourteenth Army Corps."
General Rosecrans assumed command on October 30th at Louisville. On November 2d he arrived at Bowling Green, and on the 7th he announced, in General Orders, the division of his army organization into "the Right Wing," "the Centre," and "the Left Wing," under the command respectively of McCook, Thomas, and Crittenden, with five divisions in the centre and three in each wing. He instructed Thomas to advance Fry and Dumont's divisions to Gallatin, and to push rapidly forward the repairs of the railrto Nashville.
Up to this time the movements of Bragg's army remained undeveloped, and no disposition of the Federal forces could be safely made without the knowledge of what Bragg's plan of operation would be. That he would ultimately attempt the capture of Nashville or force a battle for it there could be but little doubt. Not to fight for Nashville was the abandonment of Tennessee. Kentucky surrendered without a blow produced such demoralization in Bragg's command that to have given up Tennessee without a struggle would have either compelled a change in the commanding officer of that army or a disbandment of it, so far as the Kentucky and Tennessee troops were concerned.
General Halleck's brilliant paper campaign into East Tennessee again was produced and aired with a show of the most profound wisdom, based on the extreme ignorance of the situation and surroundings. Buell's forethought in concentrating the army within supporting distance of Nashville became apparent on the appearance of the advance of Bragg's army at Murfreesboro, reinforcing Breckinridge's command, which had been left in Tennessee to enforce the "blockade of Nashville." This was another grievance the Kentucky troops had against Bragg. All the Kentucky infantry troops under Bragg were in Breckenridge's command, and they were exceedingly anxious to return to the State with Bragg's army to visit their friends and relatives and aid in recruiting that army. Bragg's distrust of these troops was such that he refused to allow them this privilege, and his action in holding them in Tennessee, just out of Kentucky, did not materially increase his popularity with them. Breckinridge had established his headquarters at Murfreesboro and assumed chief command, with about ten thousand troops under him, over one-third of which were cavalry under Wheeler and Forrest. With this force Breckinridge endeavored to enforce the siege of Nashville, using his cavalry to prevent the gathering of forage and supplies by our troops from the surrounding country. These foraging parties were constantly sent out, going as far at times as ten miles on these expeditions. The main deprivation the garrison suffered during the six weeks of the siege was in having nearly all communication cut off from their friends in the North, and while they received nothing, they embraced every opportunity of sending letters by citizens returning north. The garrison was not willing to remain entirely on the defensive. Besides the numerous raiding parties sent out for forage which were uniformly successful, on the night of the 6th of October, Negley sent Palmer with some twenty-eight hundred troops to attack General S. R. Anderson, who had established his camp at Lavergne with some three thousand men, principally new recruits. Palmer with the artillery and about four hundred infantry to support it, moved directly on Lavergne, some fifteen miles from Nashville, while Colonel John F. Miller with about twenty-four hundred men in his command moved on the rto the right to make the attack on the rear of the enemy. Miller marched his command during the night, captured the enemy's pickets at daylight and moved on the encampment. Palmer opened with artillery as soon as he heard Miller's musketry firing and the latter, pushing his troops rapidly forward, after an engagement lasting half an hour, had the enemy in full retreat on the rto Murfreesboro with a loss of 80 killed and wounded and 175 prisoners. He also captured three pieces of artillery, and the regimental colors of the Thirty-second Alabama. Palmer's command then returned to Nashville.
During the siege of Nashville skirmishing between our pickets and the scouting parties of the enemy was constantly occurring, and the garrison of Nashville was indebted for its safety to the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Von Schrader of the Seventy-fourth Ohio, Inspector of Negley's division, as much as any one thing. Von Schrader was an educated Prussian officer and a thorough soldier. He established a system of pickets, strongly posted, with block houses for their protection, and then gave his personal attention to it that the pickets performed their entire duty. There was no determined assault on the place at any time during the siege. The only appearance of an attack in force was on the 6th of November, by a body of some eight thousand troops, equally divided between cavalry and infantry, under General Roger Hanson. Forrest, knowing that the Federal force at Nashville was not a very strong one and that by the pursuit of Bragg by Buell's army, Nashville was completely cut off from any immediate support or relief, obtained General Breckinridge's permission to make an attack with his cavalry, numbering over four thousand men, in concert with the infantry under Hanson, numbering a little less than Forrest's command. The enemy's cavalry moved in columns on the Charlotte, Franklin, and Nolinsville turnpikes from the south, while Forrest in person with 1,000 cavalry and Hanson's infantry, pushed rapidly forward on the Murfreesboro pike, arriving at the Lunatic Asylum, six miles from Nashville, by daylight. Our pickets and cavalry were driven in, and Hanson was in readiness to make the attack with the infantry when a peremptory order from Breckinridge was received, directing further operations to cease, under express orders from Bragg. After skirmishing with his cavalry around the city at the different outposts, Forrest withdrew, greatly incensed at being ordered to desist from the attack when confident of success.
Bragg in leaving a large number of men in middle Tennessee merely to watch the post of Nashville--thus crippling his army to that extent--committed a great mistake. He needed every available man in his army to make the Kentucky campaign a success. With these 10,000 troops, if Buell had left Negley's and Paine's divisions as garrisons at Nashville, Bragg's force would have outnumbered Buell's command before he reached Louisville three to two. With the defeat of Buell, Nashville would have been worse than worthless, proving an incumbrance instead of a benefit. On the other hand, with Bragg driven out of Kentucky, and opening the struggle for that State in Tennessee, the possession of Nashville as a second base of supplies for our army was an absolute necessity. Bragg, however, was correct in refusing to allow the place to be attacked by Forrest, for even in the event of success the non-combatants and sympathizing friends of the South would have suffered in person and property to an extent far beyond what the temporary occupation of the city by the Southern forces would have compensated.
Nashville was re-enforced by the arrival of the advance of the army concentrating there on the 17th of November, and a few days after Rosecrans arrived and established his headquarters in that city. The first thing that demanded the attention of the new commander was that which had given the most serious trouble to General Buell, viz.: the safety of his communications in the rear to his base of supplies. The repair to the tunnel just south of Mitchelville occupied a large force several weeks to complete. During this time all supplies for troops at Nashville were with the greatest labor hauled fifty-five miles by wagon train. The railrfrom Louisville to Nashville was re-opened on the 26th of November, and for one month every effort was made to forward supplies, so the troops could have new clothing issued to them, and that they could be provided with ammunition. The depots at Nashville were filled with needful supplies to provide against the interruption of communication arising from raids on the railrby rebel cavalry. Since the middle of November Bragg had been concentrating his forces at Murfreesboro, and anticipating that the Federal forces would go into winter quarters at Nashville, had placed his troops in quarters for the winter in the vicinity of the former place. He had sent nearly all of his cavalry to raid on the lines of the Federal communication--Morgan into Kentucky and Wheeler into West Tennessee. With this knowledge, Rosecrans, on the 26th of December, ordered his army to move out of Nashville to attack the enemy on his front.
While the army was being refitted at Nashville, Morgan's cavalry was raiding the surrounding country. On the 7th Morgan's command captured the Ninety-ninth Brigade under Colonel A. B. Moore, at Hartsville, where he had been posted by Thomas to guard the ford of the Cumberland River, and to watch the enemy on the Lebanon r The brigade consisted of three infantry regiments, a battalion of cavalry, and a section of artillery, making a force of about two thousand effective men. The command was badly posted, and the commanding officers of the infantry regiments failed to cooperate, or to obey orders. It was, in the main, a repetition of the disgraceful affair at Murfreesboro, when Forrest captured that place during the previous summer. Moore was surprised in his camp early in the morning. No warning was given by the pickets, and before any disposition could be made of the troops, Morgan's men were upon them. Morgan's command consisted of his cavalry, and two regiments of infantry. Moore threw out a skirmish line to resist the advance of Morgan's infantry and dismounted cavalry in line. The rebels pressed steadily forward to a ravine at the foot of the hill on which Moore had formed his line, and under shelter of this poured such a destructive fire upon the Federal troops, that he ordered a new line to be formed in the rear. In this movement the whole line was thrown into confusion, and being attacked on their right and rear by the rebel cavalry, who had, up to this time not been engaged, Moore's command was crowded one on the other into a narrow space where the fire of the enemy proved terribly effective. Moore's troops being unable to return the fire, and he not being able to make another disposition of them, the white flag was raised, and the entire command surrendered. Colonel Tafel, in command of the One Hundred and Sixth Ohio, becoming separated from the other troops, made some further resistance, but, being overpowered, he also surrendered. The contest only lasted a little over an hour. Moore's loss was 150 killed and wounded, his entire command captured, with all army and camp equipment, trains, and two pieces of artillery. Morgan's loss was 125 killed and wounded.
General D. S. Stanley, on reporting to Rosecrans from the Army of the Tennessee, had been assigned to the position of Chief of Cavalry to the Commanding General. On the 12th he attacked and drove the enemy out of the town of Franklin, killing five and capturing twelve men, with a large number of horses and stores. He destroyed the mills at that place, with a great quantity of valuable property.
After the capture of Hartsville by Morgan, his services were recognized by his superiors to the extent that Mr. Davis, who was on a visit to Murfreesboro shortly after this engagement, signed and handed him his commission as Brigadier-General. General Hardee urged that the appointment be made as Major-General, but this was refused. Morgan's command had increased so that it was unwieldy as one body, and he decided to form it into two brigades. His command consisted now of seven regiments,--an aggregate force of over four thousand men. This he divided, placing three regiments under Colonel Basil W. Duke, in the first brigade, with a battery of four guns. The second brigade was placed in command of Colonel W. C. P. Breckenridge, and was composed of four regiments, with one three-inch Parrot gun and the two mountain howitzers. This force, trained as it had been, had no superior for the work it was ordered to do--raiding in the rear, destroying bridges, trestleworks, and capturing bridge-guards. So accustomed had they become to hardships of every nature, that it was almost incredible the amount of rough riding, scant fare, and loss of sleep these men endured. Proud of their past success, and emboldened by it to the belief that they were able to defeat any force that could overtake them, they at last found the country south of the Ohio too confined for them, and, aiming at grander feats, they passed north of that river, and, entering upon an entirely different kind of warfare, met with complete disaster.
On the morning of the 22d the command of Morgan took the ragain for Kentucky. Bragg ordered the railrin Rosecrans's rear to be broken, and his communication with Louisville destroyed. Morgan and his men were in most excellent spirits at the prospect of another raid into that State. He had with him the pick of the youth of the State of Kentucky. On the 24th Morgan's command had their first skirmish with a battalion of Michigan troops, which resulted in the loss to Morgan of seventeen of his men and two of his officers. On the 25th Colonel Hobson had an engagement with Johnson's regiment near Munfordville, in which the rebels suffered a loss of some fifty men killed and wounded. Morgan then attacked the stockade at Bacon Creek, held by a force of 100 men, who made a most stubborn and determined resistance, inflicting severe loss upon the attacking party, and demonstrating the worth of a stockade properly built and efficiently manned. These stockades were built with heavy upright timber ten or twelve feet high. They were surrounded by ditches and pierced for musketry. Assailants, when right at the base, were still far from taking them. It was supposed that they would not resist artillery, and, in fact, they were not built with the expectation of doing so. If the garrison of the stockade succeeded in driving off the guerilla parties that swarmed through the country, it fully accomplished its purpose. This stockade successfully resisted the heavy artillery firing brought to bear upon it, even when a number of shells exploded within the work. After making such a brave defiance, it is to be regretted that they did not hold out to the last, and refuse to surrender at all. The commanding officer had rejected a number of demands made on him to surrender; when Morgan came up in person, and in his own name offering them liberal terms, they surrendered. Morgan then burnt the bridge across Bacon Creek, and pressed on to Nolin, fourteen miles beyond, where the stockade was surrendered without a fight. The bridge here also was destroyed. Morgan's division, on the 27th, captured Elizabethtown, after a severe engagement with the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Smith--a detachment of some six hundred infantry. Smith sent Morgan a demand for him to surrender, which Morgan declined, and returned the compliment by making the same demand on Smith, who also declined. After an engagement lasting some six hours, Morgan's artillery rendered the building Smith's command was fighting in untenable, and he then surrendered. The next day Morgan, moving along the railr destroyed it thoroughly. The principal object of the expedition was the great trestleworks at Muldraugh's Hills, only a short distance apart. The garrison defending the lower trestle, 600 strong, was captured by the Second Brigade. The First Brigade captured the garrison at the upper trestle--200 strong. These trestles were respectively 80 and 90 feet high, and each of them 500 feet long. They were thoroughly destroyed. Thus was accomplished the objects of the raid, but the destruction of these bridges--trestle and railr-did not accomplish the design contemplated by Bragg. Rosecrans's prompt movement from Nashville on the rebels encamped at Murfreesboro, and the result of that campaign, rendered Morgan's raid a failure in the main, as Bragg intended the rshould be so thoroughly destroyed as to prevent the further occupation of Nashville by our army. The loss to the Federals was an exceedingly severe one, and had Rosecrans remained at Nashville inactive all the winter of 1862, Bragg's designs would have met with a greater degree of success.
On the 29th, Colonel Harlan with his brigade attacked and routed Morgan's troopers at Rolling Fork of Salt River, and drove them to Bardstown. While Morgan was moving around Lebanon, Colonel Hoskins's command attacked him and captured 150 men. Morgan passed between the forces sent against him, showing again that it is impossible to catch cavalry with infantry. Morgan then commenced his retreat form the State. On the morning of January 1, 1863, as his command was passing Columbia, 115 miles in an air-line from Murfreesboro, his men reported hearing distinctly the roar of heavy cannonading in that direction. On the 2d Morgan crossed the Cumberland, and felt safe once more from all pursuit.
On December 21st, General Carter moved with three regiments of cavalry toward East Tennessee, from Lebanon, Ky., to raid on the rebel line of communication. Crossing the Cumberland Mountains forty miles northeast of Cumberland Gap, he passed through Southwestern Virginia and Tennessee to Carter's Station, destroying the Holston and Watauga bridges and several miles of railr He then leisurely returned to Kentucky by the same route he had advanced.
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