The withdrawal of the army under Bragg to Chattanooga again made that point the objective of a campaign. But several things had to be taken into consideration before this was entered into. Burnside had been ordered from Cincinnati to East Tennessee through Kentucky, and it was necessary to know the force and position of his command. If Knoxville and Cumberland Gap were under his control, then it would be reasonably safe to follow out a plan of operations looking to flank Bragg's left by a movement across the Tennessee over the ranges of mountains of Northern Georgia. But to do this, part of the force under Grant, now inactive after Vicksburg, should be ordered up at least as far east as the Tennessee, to protect the line of supplies and prevent any movement of the enemy to the rear on that flank of Rosecrans's army. Another weighty consideration was that of forage for the animals of the command. By the middle of August, corn in the valleys of Southern Tennessee and Northern Alabama would be ripe, and subject to the wants of the army. It was General Rosecrans's plan to wait until these movements could be accomplished and until the corn had ripened, and knowing the difficulties in the way at the best, of his successfully accomplishing his plans for the campaign, he wished at least to have that best in his favor.
In making his final preparations for his operations against Chattanooga, General Rosecrans considered two plans. One was to appear on the front of Chattanooga and attempt a direct attack on the town and reduce it by a lengthy siege. The other was to flank Bragg out of Chattanooga, as he had been compelled by the movement on the Tullahoma campaign to abandon his strongholds one by one.
The first plan could hardly be entertained, as Bragg was at his base, with but short lines to all important points under control of the rebel government, and at a place where in a very short time heavy reinforcements could be sent him, while Rosecrans in front of Chattanooga would be in a rough, sterile country, far away from his base of supplies, with a long wagon-haul over rocky mountain ranges from his nearest depot. To attempt the movement on the left, or through Sequatchie Valley, would concentrate Bragg's entire army at the contemplated point of crossing the Tennessee. This plan Bragg was prepared for, and was resting, quietly awaiting the movements of our army carrying it into effect. But it was not the purpose of Rosecrans to meet this expectation of his opponent. The genius of Rosecrans contemplated one of the most brilliant military movements of the war to obtain possession of this great stronghold of Nature, the gateway to East Tennessee and Northern Georgia, Chattanooga. At that time this place was of the utmost importance to each of the contending forces, and the highest prize in a military point of view that the Army of the Cumberland ever contended for.
To properly understand the magnitude and importance of the campaign that Rosecrans was now entering on, it is necessary that the topography of the country should be considered. The position of our army after the Tullahoma campaign was on the northwester base of the Cumberland range, in camp occupying McMinnville, Tullahoma, Dechard, and Winchester, with Chattanooga south of east. Immediately in front was the first great barrier in the advance movement--the Cumberland Mountains--a lofty range of rocks dividing the waters flowing into the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers. The range rises far to the north and extends to the southwest into Alabama. North of Chattanooga the mountains are much bolder, more difficult to cross, with almost sheer declivities on each of the sides.
Beyond the main range, in the direct rto Chattanooga, running south, flows the Sequatchie River through the valley of that name, formed by another range jutting off slightly to the east from the main range, and between it and the Tennessee River. This spur is known by the name of Walling's Ridge [NOTE from Brett and Bob: This is probably what is now known as Walden's Ridge which was named after a Mr. Walling or Wallen as subsequently described. This Ridge was quite sparsely populated with an estimate of 11 families at the time of the civil war, so it's history is not exactly well documented. Subsequent references use Walling's Ridge to be consistent with the original text.], after an early settler and Indian hunter. It abuts close on the Tennessee in precipitous rocky bluffs.
South of the Tennessee, and separated from the mountain ranges north by this river, are the two ranges known as Sand and Lookout Mountains. The northern extremity of the former is called Raccoon Mountain. Here the river cuts its channel as a great chasm through these mountain ranges, so sharply defined that the masses abut directly upon the water in heavy palisades of rock.
The tops of all these mountain ranges are of poor soil but generally with considerable timber; rough, with but few r, and these almost impassable for wagons and nearly destitute of water. The western slope of Sand Mountain reaches nearly to the Tennessee River. Between this latter range and Lookout Mountain is Lookout Valley with the creek of that name flowing through it into the Tennessee a short distance below Chattanooga. This valley is also known as Wills Valley, and at that time was traversed by a railrbranching from the Nashville rat Wauhatchie, terminating at Trenton.
Beyond this was Lookout range, 2,400 feet above the sea, with almost perpendicular sides, heavily wooded and with little water, abutting abruptly on the Tennessee, some two miles south of the town, with only three practical wagon r over it--one close to the river, one at Johnson's Crook, and the third at Winston's Gap, twenty-six and forty-two miles respectively south of Chattanooga.
To the east of Lookout Mountain is Chattanooga Valley with the town at the head of it and the creek of that name flowing through, with Dry Creek as a branch emptying its waters into the Tennessee just south of the town. Beyond this to the east is Missionary Ridge, and parallel to it and just beyond is Chickamauga Valley, with the creek of that name running through it emptying into the river above Chattanooga, formed by East, Middle, and West Chickamauga Creeks, uniting with Pea Vine Creek between the latter two as a tributary. Chattanooga and West Chickamauga Creeks have a common source in McLemore's Cove, which is formed by Pigeon Mountain on the east, jutting to the north as a spur of Lookout Mountain, with the latter on the west, Missionary ridge running out as it enters this cove. The wagon rfrom Chattanooga to Rome, known as the La Fayette r crosses Missionary Ridge into Chickamauga Valley at Rossville and proceeds thence nearly due south, crossing Chickamauga Creek at Lee and Gordon Mills, thence to the east of Pigeon Mountain, passing through La Fayette some twenty-two miles south of Chattanooga; it then continues on to Summerville, within twenty-five miles of Rome, and so on to the latter place.
Beyond these ranges is Taylor's ridge, with a number of lesser ranges between it and the Atlanta Railr running through Dalton. Both Pigeon Mountain and Taylor's Ridge are very rough mountain ranges, with but few r, and these only through gaps. At Dalton is the junction of the East Tennessee with the Atlanta Railr in the valley of the head waters of the Coosa River, which valley is here some ten miles wide and is the great natural passage-way into East Tennessee from the south.
To follow Bragg to Chattanooga and to cross the Tennessee above that place involved moving the army either to the north of the Sequatchie Valley by Dunlap or by Therman and Walling's Ridge, some sixty-five to seventy miles through a country poorly supplied with water, with no forage, and by narrow and difficult wagon r. This route would take Rosecrans further away from his base of supplies and line of communication than that south of the river. It was over this northern route that Bragg anticipated the onward movement of the Army of the Cumberland. This would enable him to make a protracted defence of the town and retard the advance for weeks, if not months. But Rosecrans's plan of the campaign contemplated a much more hazardous movement and a far speedier one for the possession of Chattanooga. To accomplish this, however, it was necessary to cross the Cumberland Mountains with subsistence, ammunition, a limited supply of forage, and a bridge train; then to cross his army over the Tennessee River, after that over Sand or Raccoon Mountain into Lookout Valley, and from there to cross Lookout Mountain, and finally the lesser ranges--Missionary Ridge--if he went directly to Chattanooga, or to cross Missionary Ridge, Pigeon Mountain, and Taylor's Ridge, if he struck the railrat Dalton or south of it. This involved the carrying by his army of ammunition for two great battles and twenty-five days' subsistence.
As soon as the repairs were made on the main line to Stevenson, Rosecrans ordered Sheridan's division to make an advance movement with two brigades to Bridgeport and one to Stevenson. Van Cleve had been ordered up with his divisions from Murfreesboro and was posted at McMinnville. On August 8th, stores being accumulated at the front, orders were issued to corps commanders to supply their troops, as soon as possible, with rations and forage sufficient for the general advance.
The movement over the Cumberland Mountains began on August 16th, and the troops were ordered to move as follows:
"Crittenden's corps in three columns to move through the Sequatchie Valley. Minty's cavalry to move on the left by Sparta, and after covering the left flank of Van Cleve to proceed to Pikesville.
"Thomas to move Reynolds and Brannan from University by way of Battle Creek, where they were to take post, concealed near its mouth. Negley and Baird to go by way of Tantallon and halt on Crow Creek between Anderson and Stevenson.
"McCook to move Johnson by Salem and Larkin's Ford to Bellefont. Davis by Mount Top and Crow Creek to near Stevenson. The three brigades of cavalry by Fayetteville and Athens to cover the line of the Tennessee from Whitesburg up."
These orders were complied with, and the movements completed by the evening of August 20th. Crittenden sent Hazen's brigade on a reconnoissance to Harrison's Landing, where he found the enemy throwing up works. On the next day Hazen took post at Poe's cross-r. Wilder was sent to reconnoitre from Harrison's Landing to Chattanooga. On reaching Chattanooga, he was supported by Wagner's brigade, and both commands opened fire on the next day, shelling the town from across the river. This bombardment of the place caused it to be evacuated by the rebel troops, to points beyond range outside, and the withdrawal by Bragg of his stores to points of convenience on the railrto the rear. Bragg then ordered Anderson's brigade to withdraw from Bridgeport.
The feint under Crittenden was so well timed that Bragg concentrated his immediate command at and above Chattanooga, leaving the crossing of the river by the main portion of our army later, unobstructed. Rosecrans had posted his army so that demonstrations were made simultaneously from Whitesburg to Blythe's Ferry, a distance of one hundred and fifty miles, and Bragg did not know just where to look for his real advance, but definitely concluded that it would NOT be made anywhere in the vicinity of Bridgeport. On the 26th, five days after the surprise at Chattanooga, Burnside's advance into East Tennessee was announced by the presence of his cavalry in the vicinity of Knoxville. Bragg then ordered Buckner to evacuate Knoxville, and occupy Loudon. The demonstration at Blythe's Ferry on the Tennessee, opposite the mouth of the Hiawasse, caused Bragg to order him to retire to Charleston, and soon thereafter to Chattanooga. On the 30th, information was given General Thomas that Johnston, with 15,000 men from Mississippi, had re-enforced Bragg.
Under cover of the apparent activity of the left of our army in front of and above Chattanooga, Rosecrans effected safely the crossing of the first great barrier to the objective point, and reached the banks of the Tennessee opposite the enemy, concealing as far as he could the movements of his troops, and the position of his pontoons and trains. He then had the river reconnoitered, that the best points might be selected and the means at once provided for the crossing. As soon as the crossings had been determined on, the proper dispositions were made to begin the movement.
The Tennessee River, at the various points where our army was to cross, is very wide; and, swollen by recent rains, was quite high for that season of the year. The troops crossed the river at four points. As there were not enough pontoons for two bridges, Sheridan had commenced trestlework for part of one at Bridgeport. Reynolds advanced to Shellmound, seizing the place. Here he captured a number of boats, and with these and other material picked up, he was enabled to cross at that point, while Brannan crossed his division from the mouth of Battle Creek on rafts. The main crossing of McCook's corps was at Caperton's Ferry, about forty miles below Chattanooga, where the pontoon bridge was laid by Davis's division, after driving a detachment of rebel cavalry from the opposite side.
The movement across the river was commenced on August 29th, and completed on September 4th. Baird, in command of a division of Thomas's corps, crossed the river at Bridgeport after the repairs were completed to the bridge. Negley's division crossed at Caperton's Ferry. The four divisions of Thomas's corps with great difficulty crossed Sand Mountain, and concentrated near Trenton in Will's Valley, east of Sand Mountain. On September 6th Negley's division, being in the advance, reached Johnson's Crook where Beatty's brigade was sent at once up the mountain to seize Steven's Gap. Before proceeding far he met the enemy's pickets, and, night coming on, he went into camp just west of the gap. The Eighteenth Ohio went a short distance on the rto the top of Lookout Mountain, met the enemy's pickets and withdrew. The next day, Baird's division supporting Negley, the latter with two brigades, moved forward, and with his advance gained possession of the top of the mountain, and secured the forks of the r The entire of Negley's division reached this point on the 9th, at the head of Johnson's Crook, and with one brigade held the pass while another was sent a short distance north on the mountain to seize Cooper's Gap, with a regiment in the advance to occupy and hold the entrance on the east. Another regiment was sent forward to hold Stevens's Gap, which was found heavily obstructed with fallen timber. Negley still being in the advance, moved the day following across Missionary Ridge, and took up a position in McLemore's Cove on the rthrough Dug Gap. Here he found the enemy's cavalry drawn up in line, and learned from citizens that the rebels were in strong force concentrated in his front in Dug Gap, with infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Baird's division was in supporting distance of Negley.
Early in the morning of the 9th Reynolds sent the Ninety-second Illinois (mounted infantry) to make a reconnoissance along the top of Lookout Mountain, to discover the enemy's movements and to determine the rumors in regard to the evacuation of Chattanooga. At 11 A.M. the regiment entered the town as the rear of the enemy's column was leaving the place. The next day the four divisions of the Fourteenth Corps were in supporting distance of each other, with Negley still in front of Dug Gap, the enemy holding the east entrance with a heavy force, and the Gap full of obstructions. Negley discovered early on the following day that his situation was critical, and that he was in danger of losing his train. He determined to fall back to a strong position in front of Stevens's Gap, which movement he proceeded to execute, and succeeded in the face of the enemy by his energy and skill, with the prompt co-operation of Baird, in securing his position in front of the gap without the loss of a single wagon. The next day the location of Bragg's army at La Fayette with Johnston's reinforcements was fully determined, and Thomas's corps now awaited the movements of the other troops with reference to the concentration of the army.
In the meantime Davis's and Johnson's divisions of McCook's corps, crossing the river at Caperton's Ferry, moved over Sand Mountain into Will's Valley, and thence--Davis being in the advance--moved into and seized Winston's Gap, some twenty-five miles from Caperton's Ferry, and about forty-two from Chattanooga. Sheridan's division crossed the river at the railrbridge, moved through Trenton, and on the 6th encamped twelve miles from Winston's Gap. McCook sent several detachments on the 8th and 9th to different points, reconnoitering the enemy. One went to Alpine and two into Broomtown Valley, but nothing was discovered of Bragg's whereabouts. On the evening of the 9th Rosecrans sent orders to McCook, stating that the enemy had evacuated Chattanooga and were retreating southward, and directing him to move rapidly upon Alpine and Summerville in pursuit, to intercept his line of retreat, and to attack on his flank. The day following McCook reached Alpine, where he discovered the situation. The enemy had not retreated very far from Chattanooga, the exact location as yet unknown. McCook learned that he could not communicate with Thomas, as his couriers could not pass through the valley, occupied as it was by the enemy in force, and that his corps was entirely isolated at Alpine. That, had he gone to Summerville, he would have been exposed to an attack from the entire rebel army, which his reconnoissance later determined was concentrated in force near La Fayette. On the following day McCook remained in camp waiting for Thomas to move up on him. He, however, sent his wagon-train back to the summit of Lookout Mountain. On the 12th McCook waited in camp for reports from the cavalry as to the position and movements of the enemy.
Crittenden's corps had during the time moved down the Sequatchie Valley, in readiness for an active campaign. He then crossed the river at Bridgeport, Shell Mound, and Battle Creek, and on September 4th his entire corps was across the river. He was ordered to move up the valley of Running Water Creek and Whiteside, leaving one division on the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railr and to push forward as near as possible to Chattanooga, threatening the enemy in that direction. At 6 A.M. on the 9th Crittenden was informed by a despatch from Rosecrans that Chattanooga had been abandoned by the enemy, and that he was to push forward at once with five day's rations and make a vigorous pursuit. During the morning Crittenden with Wood's division occupied the town, and Wood was placed in command. Palmer's and Van Cleve's were turned off south after they passed the spur of Lookout Mountain, and encamped at Rossville, five miles south of Chattanooga. In the afternoon of the same day Crittenden was ordered to leave a brigade at Chattanooga, and with the balance of his command to pursue the enemy with the utmost vigor, the line of march to be through Ringgold and on to Dalton. The next day Crittenden left Wagner--who had crossed the river from the front of the town during the night--in command, and ordered forward Palmer's, Van Cleve's, and the two brigades of Wood's division in pursuit, marching on the Rossville and Riggold r During the afternoon Palmer reported the enemy's cavalry strong on his front, that he had only been able to march six miles, had encamped at Chickamauga Creek, and that his advance had been checked by a charge of the rebel cavalry. That night Crittenden received several reports from his front that the enemy was in force near La Fayette, and threatening to retake Chattanooga.
During the 11th, Wood, with his two brigades, was on a reconnoissance at Gordon's Mills, and Crittenden was ordered to occupy Ringgold and report. These movements determined to Rosecrans's satisfaction the position of the enemy in force in the vicinity of La Fayette. He immediately ordered Crittenden to close his entire command upon Wood, crossing as quickly as possible to the Rossville and La Fayette r to some point near Lee and Gordon's Mills. Early on the morning of the 12th, Wilder was ordered back to Ringgold and directed to follow on the line of march of the infantry, covering the left flank. Crittenden succeeded during the day in effecting a concentration of his command at Lee and Gordon's Mills, which point Wilder's brigade reached after a severe skirmish during the day near Leet's tanyard, where he lost thirty men killed and wounded. With the knowledge that Bragg was concentrating his forces awaiting reinforcements behind Pigeon Mountain, in the vicinity of La Fayette, and that his own army was scattered a distance of thirty miles from flank to flank--from Lee and Gordon's Mills to Alpine--Rosecrans felt that it was a matter of life and death to effect the concentration of his army in the shortest possible space of time.
During these movements of the army under Rosecrans, what was Bragg doing? On August 20th, the movement of our army over the Cumberland Mountains was reported to Bragg, and he then knew that he might look for an immediate advance. The movement of our army across the Tennessee was also reported to Bragg by his scouts, but was regarded by him as incredible. These reports were soon after confirmed by the news that our cavalry had occupied Trenton and had advanced up the Will's Valley Railras far as Wauhatchie, within seven miles of Chattanooga, as a covering force under which Rosecrans's columns of infantry were advancing. Our army was now as near the line of communication of the rebel army, as the latter was to the line to Nashville, and with less risk in its advance movements should Bragg commence operations to the north. Bringing his cavalry forward at once, Bragg soon ascertained that the general movement of our army was toward his left and rear in the direction of Dalton and Rome, keeping Lookout Mountain between the armies. He then determined to meet our army as its columns debouched from the defiles of the mountains. To hold Chattanooga would require at least two strong divisions, and he felt that his force would not permit this and make a successful attack also. Bragg put his army in motion on September 7th and 8th, and took up position from Lee and Gordon's Mills to La Fayette, on the rrunning south from Chattanooga, with the front to the east side of Lookout Mountain, and on the east bank of Chickamauga Creek, establishing his headquarters at the former place.
The positions of our detached corps was fully known to Bragg on the 8th. Learning of Negley's movement of the 9th into McLemore's cove, Bragg rightly interpreted it to mean that a hurried pursuit was being made after his force, under the idea that he was in full retreat. With his own force concentrated in front of the centre, Bragg at once saw how Rosecrans had exposed the corps of his army to be attacked and defeated in detail, and that evening he gave order to Hindman to prepare his division to move against Negley, and ordered Hill to send or take Cleburne's division, join Hindman, and immediately move upon Negley. On receipt of these orders, Hill replied that his part of the movement was impracticable, as Cleburne was sick, and that both gaps--Dug and Catlett's--had been closed by felling timber which would require twenty-four hours to remove. Hindman having marched during the night of the 9th some ten miles, was now in position, some three miles from Negley in the cove. Bragg not wishing to lose so favorable an opportunity of striking his opponent's force, ordered Buckner with his command to move from Anderson and join Hindman in the cove, which he did during the afternoon of the 10th. After these commands had united, the commanders held a consultation and determined that a change in the plan of operations should be made. Bragg having removed his headquarters to La Fayette, "so as to secure more prompt and decided action in the movements ordered against the enemy's centre," now directed Polk to send his remaining division to support Hindman during the operations in the cove. Despatching an officer to Bragg with a report as to this change of plans, Hindman and Cleburne waited his return. Bragg refused to make any change, and sent a verbal order to Hindman to proceed at once to carry out his previous instruction. Bragg at the same time sent written orders by courier to Hindman, notifying him of the movements of our forces, that Polk had been directed to cover his rear, and ordered him to attack and force his way through Negley to La Fayette at the earliest hour in the morning, and adds "Cleburne will attack in front the moment your guns are heard." Walker's reserve corps was also ordered to move promptly, join Cleburne's division at Dug Gap and unite in the attack. All obstructions were removed from Dug and Catlett's Gaps, and Breckenridge's division of Hill's corps was kept in position south of La Fayette to check any movement of our troops from that direction, thus putting 30,000 troops in position to crush Negley and Baird. Bragg shortly after daylight joined Cleburne, where they waited nearly all day for Hindman's guns to open--when Cleburne was to attack--on the flank and rear of Negley and Baird's divisions. After waiting long past noon in great anxiety for Hindman's attack, about the middle of the afternoon his first gun was heard. Cleburne at once pressed forward and discovered that Negley had fallen back to Steven's Gap.
Bragg, finding his attempt against Thomas's corps a failure, then determined to hurl his columns upon Crittenden's divided corps, approaching from Chattanooga, by withdrawing the troops engaged in the movement on Thomas's command to La Fayette, and directing Polk's and Walker's corps to move immediately in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mills. Bragg knew Crittenden's corps was divided, but supposed only one division had been sent to Ringgold. At six o'clock on the evening of the 12th, Bragg wrote again to Polk, notifying him of Crittenden's position of the 11th, and stated: "This presents you a fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight to-morrow. This division crushed, and the others are yours. We can then turn on the force in the cove. Wheeler's cavalry will move on Wilder so as to cover your right. I shall be delighted to hear of your success." Later in the evening two additional orders were issued to Polk, urging him to attack promptly at "day-dawn," on the 13th; that our army was concentrating, and that it should be quick and decided." At eleven o'clock that night Polk sent a dispatch stating that he had taken a strong position for defense and asked that he be heavily re-enforced. Bragg sent him an immediate order not to defer his attack, as his command was numerically superior to the opposing force, and told him that to secure success, prompt and rapid movements on his part were necessary. Early on the morning of the 13th, Bragg, at the head of Buckner's command, went to the front, and found no advance had been made by Polk as ordered, and that Crittenden had united his forces and recrossed the Chickamauga.
Again the attempt to strike our army in detail had failed, and now Bragg gave orders to his commanders to concentrate along the east bank of Chickamauga in position for battle, and as soon as his reinforcements under Longstreet from Virginia were up to attack with the entire command. Wheeler, with two divisions of cavalry on the extreme left, was ordered to engage the attention of Thomas in McLemore's Cove, covering the main movement of the rebel army; Forrest with his own and Pegram's divisions of cavalry covered the right and front. Bragg ordered B. R. Johnson's brigade from Ringgold, where he had been stationed protecting the railr to take position near Reed's bridge on the extreme right of his line. Walker's corps was then formed on Johnson's left, opposite Alexander's Bridge. Buckner's corps was formed on the left of Walker, near Ledford's Ford. Polk's corps was placed in line opposite Lee and Gordon's Mills on Buckner's left, with Hill on the extreme left. Two brigades that had just arrived from Mississippi were placed under Johnson on the right, making his command a division of three brigades strong. To this division in the earlier movements three brigades of Longstreet's corps from Virginia were temporarily attached. On the 18th, Hood reporting, was placed in command of this column on the right.
The rebel army on the 17th were in position, and that evening Bragg issued his orders for his forces to cross the Chickamauga, commencing the movement at six o'clock on the morning of the 18th. Bragg's plan of battle for the 18th was for the column under Johnson--later under Hood--to cross in force at Reed's Bridge, rapidly turn to the left by the most practicable route, and sweep up the Chickamauga toward Lee and Gordon's Mills. Walker's corps next on the left, crossing at Alexandria Bridge, was to unite in the movement, pressing our army vigorously on flank and rear, in the same direction. Buckner, crossing at Ledford's Ford, was to join in the movement to the left, pressing our army back up the stream from Polk's front. The latter to push forward to the front at Lee and Gordon's Mills, and if not able to cross there, to bear to the right and cross at Dalton's Ford or Alexander's Bridge, and unite in the attack wherever he could find an opposing force. Hill, to cover the left flank of the rebel army from an advance by our forces in the cove, to ascertain by pressing his cavalry to the front if we were reinforcing our corps at Lee and Gordon's Mills, and if so to attack on the flank. This plan contemplated the destruction of the left of our army, the seizing of the La Fayette r and, if possible, occupying and holding the r in Chattanooga Valley, cutting off all access from Chattanooga. These movements were not executed as rapidly as was contemplated by Bragg, owing to the resistance made by our cavalry and Wilder's mounted infantry, and the difficulties arising from bad and narrow r. Johnson was repeatedly urged to commence the movement on the right, but he delayed his advance until late in the afternoon, when Hood arrived and effected the crossing. Walker moved up to Alexander's Bridge, at which point Wilder hotly contested his crossing, and finally broke up the bridge. Walker moved down the creek to Byron's Ford, where he crossed and joined Hood on the right during the night. On Walker's crossing, Wilder was compelled to fall back.
The concentration of our army continued on the 13th, Thomas held his position of the 12th, with Negley's, Baird's, and Brannan's divisions remaining in camp, waiting the arrival of McCook, who had been ordered to close up to the left. Reynolds's division was concentrated on the rfrom Cooper's or Frick's Gap to Catlett's Gap, and the next day moved forward and took position at Pond Spring, with his two infantry brigades, and was joined here by Wilder. Reynolds sent Turchin to make a reconnoissance with the Ninety-second Illinois mounted infantry, to the mouth of Catlett's Gap, driving the rebel cavalry pickets from Chickamauga Creek to the gap, where he found the enemy posted with strong reserves. Brannan on the same day reconnoitered the position of the enemy toward Dug Gap, sending a brigade to Chickamauga Creek, east of Lee's Mills, one mile to the right and south of Reynolds, at Pond Spring. Turchin made another reconnoissance on the 16th toward Catlett's Gap, and found the enemy strongly posted there with infantry and artillery. The next day Thomas moved his entire corps and closed upon Crittenden's right along Chickamauga Creek, and was joined at night by McCook on his right. The four divisions of Thomas's command on the afternoon of the 18h moved to the left to Crawfish Springs. Here Rosecrans, anticipating the movement of Bragg to secure the rto Chattanooga, and recognizing the importance of holding it, ordered Thomas with his corps to march on the cross-rleading by the Widow Glenn's to the Chattanooga and La Fayette r and take position on that rnear Kelly's farm, connecting with Crittenden's corps on his right at Gordon's Mills. During the entire night of the 18th the troops of Thomas's corps were moving to the left, and at daylight on the 19th the head of the column reached Kelly's farm; Baird's division in the advance, taking position at the forks of the r facing toward Reed's and Alexander's Bridges over the Chickamauga. Wilder had been driven across the State rto the heights east of Widow Glenn's house the evening before, by the advance in force of the enemy over these bridges, and Baird's right rested close to Wilder's brigade. Baird's division was closely followed by Brannan, who was placed in position on the left of Baird, on the two r leading to the bridges.
Orders were received by McCook at midnight on the 13th, directing two divisions of his corps to move to Thomas's support, and that he send his train back under guard of his remaining division. McCook moved his command, by way of Valley Head, up the mountain at Alpine on the night of the 13th, and down on the 14th into Lookout Valley, except one brigade from each division forming his train guard under command of Lytle, encamped at Little River in the mountains. Sheridan's marched down Lookout Valley to Johnson's Crook, while Johnson's and Davis's divisions were sent from Valley head on the direct rto Stevens's Gap. General Lytle was ordered to make a reconnoissance with two brigades toward Dougherty's Gap at the head of McLemore's Cove, and on the night of the 18th General Lytle joining the corps with two of his brigades, McCook's command was closed up on the Fourteenth Corps, except Post's brigade of Davis's division, ordered by General Rosecrans to hold Stevens's Gap at all hazards.
Crittenden on the 13th, under orders from headquarters, posted Wood's division in a strong position at Lee and Gordon's Mills, under orders to resist any advance of the enemy to last, and in case of extremity, if Granger was not in position to support, then to fall back to some point where he could guard the rto Chattanooga and the one around the point of Lookout Mountain, and hold both r, as long as he had a man under him. The next day Crittenden moved the two remaining divisions of his corps to a position on the southern spur of Missionary Ridge, his right communicating with Thomas, where he was to remain, covering the rin Chattanooga Valley. Finding no movement of the enemy on his front, on the 15th Crittenden was ordered to return with his command and take position near Crawfish Spring, with Van Cleve on the left and Palmer on the right. During the day Minty with the cavalry made an extended reconnoissance on the front, finding the enemy in force at all points. Wood, holding position on Chickamauga Creek, at Lee and Gordon's Mills, on the morning of the 18th reported the enemy advancing with strong line of skirmishers on his left and asked for supports. Van Cleve was placed on Wood's left and Palmer then took Van Cleve's position on Wood's right. Wilder in the afternoon reported Minty's cavalry driven back after being re-enforced with two of his regiments; that the enemy was flanking him and that he would fall back on Wood. Palmer later in the day was placed on the left of Van Cleve's new position on the line of Chickamauga Creek, his last brigade reaching its position at four o'clock on the morning of the 19th; Wood holding his position on the creek at Lee and Gordon's Mills, which at this point runs between steep rocky bluffs in an eastwardly course, with the rto Chattanooga via Rossville crossing it at right angles; Van Cleve on his left and Palmer on the left of Van Cleve; the general course of the line being northeasterly along the Chickamauga and Rossville r
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