The influence of the village community is especially. apparent in respect of that portion of the soil which is used for the support of cattle. The management of meadows is very interesting because it presents a close analogy to the treatment of the arable, and at the same time the communal features are much more clearly brought out by it. We may take as an instance a description in the Eynsham Survey. The meadow in Shifford is divided into twelve strips, and these are distributed among the lord and the tenantry, but they are not apportioned to any one for constant ownership. One year the lord takes all the strips marked by uneven numbers, and the next year he moves to those distinguished by even numbers. The tenants divide the rest according to some settled rotation. Very often lots are drawn to indicate the portions of the several households. It must be added that the private right of the single occupiers does not extend over the whole year: as in the case of the arable all inclosures fall after the harvest, so in regard to meadows the separate use, and the boundaries protecting it, are upheld only till the mowing of the grass: after the removal of the hay the soil relapses into the condition of undivided land. The time of the 'defence' extends commonly to 'Lammas-day'; hence the expression 'Lammas-meadow' to designate such land. It is hardly necessary to insist on the great resemblance between all these features and the corresponding facts in the arrangement of the arable. The principle of division is supplied by the tendency to assign an equal share to every holding, and the system of scattered strips follows as a necessary consequence of the principle. The existence of the community as a higher organising unit is shewn in the recurrence of common use after the 'defence,' and in the fact that the lord is subjected to the common rotation, although he is allowed a privileged position in regard to it. The connexion in which the whole of these rights arises is made especially clear by the shifting ownership of the strips: private right appears on communal ground, but it is reduced to a minimum as it were, has not settled down to constant occupation, and assumes its definite shape under the influence of the idea of equal apportionment. Of course, by the side of these communal meadows we frequently find others that were owned in severalty.
Land for pasture also occurs in private hands and in severalty, but such cases are much rarer. Sometimes the pasture gets separated and put under 'defence' for one part of the year, and merges into communal ownership afterwards. But in the vast majority of cases the pasture is used in common, and none of the tenants has a right to fence it in or to appropriate it for his own exclusive benefit. It ought to be noted, that the right to send one's cattle to the pasture on the waste, the moors, or in the woods of a manor appears regularly and intimately connected with the right to depasture one's cattle on the open fields of the village. Both form only different modes of using communal soil. As in the case of arable and meadow the undivided use cannot be maintained and gets replaced by a system of equalised shares or holdings, so in the case of pasture the faculty of sending out any number of beasts retires before the equalisation of shares according to certain modes of 'stinting' the common. We find as an important manorial arrangement the custom to 'apportion' the rights of common to the tenements, that is to decide in the manorial Court, mostly according to verdicts of juries, how many head of cattle, and of what particular kind, may be sent to the divers pasture-grounds of the village by the several holdings. From time to time these regulations are revised. One of the Glastonbury Surveys contains, for instance, the following description from the 45th year of Henry III. Each hide may send to the common eighteen oxen, sixteen cows, one bull, the offspring of the cows of two years, two hundred sheep with four rams, as well as their offspring of one year, four horses and their offspring of one year, twenty swine and their offspring of one year. According to a common rule the only cattle allowed to use the village pasture was that which was constantly kept in the village, levant e couchant en le maner. In order to guard against the fraudulent practice of bringing over strange cattle and thus making money at the expense of the township, it was required sometimes that the commonable cattle should have wintered in the manor.
These last rules seem at first sight difficult of explanation: one does not see in what way the bringing in of strange cattle could damage the peasantry of the village, as nobody could drive more than a certain number of beasts to the common, and as the overburdening of it depended entirely on the excess of this number, and not on the origin of the beasts. And so one has to look to something else besides the apprehension that the common would get overburdened, in order to find a suitable explanation of the rule. An explanation is readily supplied by the notion that the use of the common was closely connected with the holding. Strange cattle had nothing to do with the holding, and were to be kept off from the land of the community. it is as representatives of a community whose territory has been invaded that the individual commoners have cause to complain. In fact, the common pasture, as well as the meadows, were thought of merely as a portion of the holding. The arrangements did not admit of the same certainty or rather of the same kind of determination as the division of the arable, but the main idea which regulated the latter was by no means cut short in its operation, if one may say so: it was not bound up with the exact measurement of arable acres. The holding was the necessary agricultural outfit of a peasant family, and of this outfit the means of feeding the cattle were quite as important a part as the means of raising crops. It is only inaccurately that we have been speaking of a virgate of 30 acres, and of a ploughland of 180 or 160. The true expression would be to speak of a virgate of 30 acres of arable and the corresponding rights to pasture and other common uses. And the records, when they want to give something like a full description, do not omit to mention the 'pertinencia,' the necessary adjuncts of the arable. The term is rather a vague one, quite in keeping with the rights which, though tangible enough, cannot be cut to so certain a pattern as in the case of arable. And for this reason the laxer right had to conform to the stricter one, and came to be considered as appendant to it.
We have considered till now the different aspects assumed by common of pasture, when it arises within the manor, and as a consequence of the arrangement of its holdings. But this is not the only way in which common of pasture may arise. It may originate in an express and special grant by the lord either to a tenant or to a stranger. it may also proceed from continuous use from time beyond legal memory. it must have been difficult in many cases to prevent strangers from establishing such a claim by reason of long occupation in some part of a widely stretching moor or wood pasture. It was not less difficult in such cases to draw exact boundaries between adjoining communities, and we find that large tracts of country are used as a common pasture-ground by two villages, and even by more. Neighbours deem it often advantageous to establish a certain reciprocity in this respect. By special agreement or by tacit allowance lords and tenants intercommon on each other's lands: this practice extends mostly to the waste only, but in some cases the arable and meadow are included after the removal of the crop and of the hay. The procedure of the writ 'quo jure' was partly directed to regulate these rights and to prevent people from encroaching wantonly upon their neighbours. When land held in one fee or one manor was broken up for some reason into smaller units, the rights of pasture were commonly kept up according to the old arrangements.
These different modes of treating the pasture present rather an incongruous medley, and may be classified in several ways and deduced from divers sources.
The chief distinctions of modern law are well known: 'Common Appendant is the right which every freehold tenant of the manor possesses, to depasture his commonable cattle, levant and couchant on his freehold tenement anciently arable, on the wastes of the manor, and originally on all (common) pasture in the manor. Common appurtenant on the other hand is against common right, becoming appurtenant to land either by long user or by grant express or implied. Thus it covers a right to common with animals that are not commonable, such as pigs, donkeys, goats, and geese; or a right to common claimed for land not anciently arable, such as pasture, or land reclaimed from the waste within the time of legal memory, or for land that is not freehold, but copyhold.' Common in gross is a personal right to common pasture in opposition to the praedial rights. Mr Scrutton has shown from the Year that these terms and distinctions emerge gradually during the fourteenth century, and appear substantially settled only in Littleton's treatise. Bracton and his followers, Fleta and Britton, do not know them. These are important facts, but they hardly warrant the inferences which have been drawn from them. The subject has been in dispute in connexion with discussions as to the free village community. Joshua Williams, in his Rights of Common, had assumed common appendant to originate in ancient customary right bestowed by the village community and not by the lord's grant; Scrutton argues that such a right is not recognised by the documents. He lays stress on the fact, that Bracton speaks only of two modes of acquiring common, namely, express grant by the lord, and long usage understood as constant sufferance on the part of the lord amounting to an express grant. But this is only another way of saying that Bracton's exposition is based on feudal notions, that his land law is constructed on the principle 'nulle terre sans seigneur,' and that every tenement, as well as every right to common, is considered in theory as granted by the lord of the manor. It may be admitted that Bracton does not recognise just that kind of title which later lawyers knew as appendancy, does not recognise that a man can claim common by showing merely that he is a freeholder of the manor. Unless he relies on long continued user, he must rely upon grant or feoffment. But the distinction between saying 'I claim common because I am a freeholder of the manor' and saying 'I claim common because I or my ancestors have been enfeoffed of a freehold tenement of the manor and the right of common passed by the feoffment,' though it may be of juristic interest and even of some practical importance as regulating the burden of proof and giving rise to canons for the interpretation of deeds, is still a superficial distinction which does not penetrate deeply into the substance of the law. On the whole we find that the freeholder of Bracton's time and of earlier times does normally enjoy these rights which in after time were described as 'appendant' to his freehold; and it is well worth while to ask whether behind the general assumptions of feudal theory there do not lie certain data which, on the one hand, prepare and explain later terminology, and are connected, on the other, with the historical antecedents of the feudal system.
A little reflection will show that the divisions of later law did not spring into being merely as results of legal reasoning and casuistry. indeed, from a lawyer's point of view, nothing can be more imperfect than a classification which starts from three or four principles of division seemingly not connected with each other. Common appendant belongs to a place anciently arable, common appurtenant may belong to land of any kind; the first is designed for certain beasts, the second for certain others; one is bound up with freehold, the other may go with copyhold; in one case the right proceeds from common law, in the other from 'specialty.' One may reasonably ask why a person sending a cow to the open fields or to the waste from a freehold tenement can claim common appendant, and his neighbour sending a cow to the same fields from a copyhold has only common appurtenant. Or again, why does a plot of arable reclaimed from the waste confer common appurtenant, and ancient arable common appendant? Or again, why are the goats or the swine of a tenement sent to pasture by virtue of common appurtenant, and the cows and horses by virtue of common appendant? And, above all, what have the several restrictions and definitions to do with each other? Such a series of contrasted attributes defies any attempt to simplify the rules of the case according to any clearly defined principle: it seems a strange growth in which original and later elements, important and secondary features, are capriciously brought together.
In order to explain these phenomena we have to look to earlier and not to later law. What seems arbitrary and discordant in modern times, appears clear and consistent in the original structure of the manor.
The older divisions may not be so definitely drawn and so developed as the later, but they have the advantage of being based on fundamental differences of fact. Even when the names and terms do not appear well settled, the subject-matter arranges itself according to some natural contrasts, and it is perhaps by too exclusive study of names and terms that Mr. Scrutton has been prevented from duly appreciating the difference in substance. He says of the end of the thirteenth century: 'In the reports about this time it seems generally to be. assumed that if the commoner cannot show an especialte or special grant or title, he must show "fraunc tenement en la ville a ques commune est appendant." Thus we have the question: -- "Coment clamez vous commune? Com appendant, ou par especialte,' while Hengham, J. says: 'prescription de terre est assez bon especialte"' (p. 50). This is really the essence of all the rules regarding common of pasture, and, what is more, the contrast follows directly from arrangements which did not come into use in the fourteenth century, but were in full work at the time of Bracton and long before it. What is called in later law common appendant, appears as the normal adjunct to the holding, that is, to a share in the system of village husbandry. If a bovate is granted to a person, so much of the rights of pasture as belongs to every bovate in the village is presumed to be granted with the arable. ' So much as belongs to every bovate in the village; 'this means, that the common depends in this case on a general arrangement of the pasture in the village. Such an arrangement exists in every place; it is regulated by custom and by the decisions of the manorial court or halimote, it extends equally over the free and over the unfree land, over the waste, the moor and wood, and over the fallow. It admits a certain number and certain kinds of beasts, and excludes others. Only because such a general arrangement is supposed to exist, is the right to com mon treated in so vague a manner; the documents present, in truth, only a reference to relations which are substantiated in the husbandry system of the manor. But the right of common may exceed these lines in many ways: it may be joined to a tenement which lies outside the manorial system, or a plot freshly reclaimed from the waste, or to a holding belonging to some other manor. It may admit a greater number and other kinds of beasts than those which were held commonable in the usual course of manorial husbandry. In such cases the right to pasture had to proceed from some special agreement or grant, and, of course, had to be based on something different from the ordinary reference to the existing system of common husbandry. If there was no deed to go by, such a right could only be established by long use.
I think that all this must follow necessarily as soon as the main fact is admitted, that common is normally the right to pasture of a shareholder of the manor. The objection may be raised, that such a priori reasoning is not sufficient in the case, because the documents do not countenance it by their classification. Would the objection be fair? Hardly, if one does not insist on finding in Bracton the identical terms used in Coke upon Littleton. It is true that Bracton speaks of common in general, and not of common appendant, appurtenant, and in gross, but the right of common which he treats as normal appears to be very peculiar on a closer examination of his rules. It is praedial and not personal; to begin with, it is always thought of as belonging to a tenement. What is more, it cannot belong to a tenement reclaimed from the waste, and in this way the requirement of 'ancient arable' is established, that is, the pasture is considered as one of the rights conceded to the original shares of a manorial community. The use of the open field outside the time of reasonable defence is primarily meant, and the common pasture appears from this point of view as one of the stages in the process of common farming. To make up the whole, the right to common is defined by a 'quantum pertinet.' which has a sense only in connexion with the admeasurement of claims effected by the internal organisation of the manor. Such is evidently the normal arrangement presupposed by Bracton's description, and his only fault is, that he does not distinguish with clearness between the consequences of the normal arrangement, and of grants or usurpations which supplement and modify it. It must be remembered that he only gives the substantive law about common rights in the course of a discussion of the pleadings in actions 'quo jure' and assizes of pasture. If we compare with Bracton's text the rules and decisions laid down in the legal practice of the thirteenth century, we shall find that the same facts are implied by them. They all suppose a contrast between 'intrinsec' and 'forinsec' claims to common, that is between the rights of those who are members of the manorial group, and the rights, if any, of those who are outside it, and again a contrast between the normal rights of commoners and any more extensive rights acquired by special grant or agreement. Only the freeholders are protected in the enjoyment of their commons; only the freeholders are protected in the enjoyment of their tenements; but their claims are based on arrangements in which the unfree land participates in everything with the free. It may be added that litigation mostly arises from the adjustment of 'forinsec' claims under the writ 'Quo jure.' The intercommoning between neighbours gives rise to a good many disputes, and is much too frequent to be considered, as it was by later law, a mere 'excuse for trespassing.' This common 'pur cause de vicinage' may be a relic of a time when adjoining villages formed a part of a higher unit of some kind, of the Mark, of a hundred, for example. It may be explained also by the difficulty of setting definite boundaries in wide tracts of moor and forest. However this may be, its constant occurrence forms another germ of a necessary contrast between the two classes which afterwards developed into common appendant and common appurtenant. It could not be brought under the same rules as those which flowed from the internal arrangement of the manor. A special difficulty attended it as to admeasurement: the customary treatment of other holdings could not in this case serve as a standard. The very laxity of the principle naturally gave occasion to very different interpretations and deductions. And so we are justified in saying, that the chief distinctions of later law are to be found in their substance in the thirteenth century, and that although a good deal of confusion occurs in details, the earlier documents give even better clues than the later to the reasons which led to the well-known classification.
Common appendant, if we may use the modern term for the sake of brevity, is indissolubly connected with the system of husbandry followed by the village community. A very noticeable feature of it is, that, in one sense, it towers over the lord of the manor as well as over the tenants. Of course, legally the lord is considered as the owner of the waste, but even from the point of view of pure law his ownership is restricted by his own grants. in so much as he has conceded freehold tenements to certain persons, he is bound by his own deed not to withhold from these persons the necessary adjuncts of such tenements, and especially the rights of pasture bound up with them. The free tenants share with the lord, if he wants to turn his common pasture to some special and lucrative use; if, for instance, strangers are admitted to it for money, one part of the proceeds goes to the tenantry. Again, the lord may not overburden the common, and sometimes freeholders try their hand at litigation against the lord on the ground that he sends his cattle to some place where they ought not to go. The point cannot be overlooked, that the lord of the manor appears subjected to certain rules set up by custom and common decision in the meetings of his tenantry. The number and kind of beasts which may come to the common from his land is fixed, as well as the number that may come from the land of a cottager. The freeholders alone can enforce the rule against him, but it is set up not by the freeholders, but by the entire community of the manor, and practically by the serfs more than by the freeholders, because they are so much more numerous.
As the common of pasture appears as an outcome of a system of husbandry set up by the village community, so every change in the use of the pasture ought in the natural course to proceed from a decision of this community. Such a change may be effected in one of two manners: the customary rotation of crops may be altered, or else a part of the waste may be reclaimed for tillage. In the first case, a portion of the open arable and meadow, which ought to have been commonable at a certain time, ceases to be so; in the second, the right to send cattle to the waste is stinted in so much as the arable is put under defence, or the land is used for the construction of dwellings. By the common law the free tenants alone could obtain a remedy for any transgression in this respect. I have mentioned already that suits frequently arose when the old-fashioned rotation of crops was modified in accordance with the progress of cultivation. As to the right of approving from the waste, the relative position of lord and tenants was for a long time debateable, and, as everybody knows, the lord was empowered to approve by the Statute of Merton of 20 Henry III, with the condition that he should leave sufficient pasture to his free tenants according to the requirements of their tenements. The same power was guaranteed by the Statute of Westminster II against the claims of neighbours. It has been asked whether, before the Statute of Merton, the lord had power to enclose against commoners, if he left sufficient common to satisfy their rights. Bracton's text in the passage where he treats of the Statute is distinctly in favour of the view that this legislative enactment did actually alter the common law, and that previously it was held that a lord could not approve without the consent of his free-tenants. Turning to the practice of the thirteenth-century courts, we find that the lawyers were rather doubtful as to this point. In a case of 1221 the jurors declare, that although the defendant has approved about two acres of land from the waste where the plaintiff had common, this latter has still sufficient pasture left to him. And thereupon the plaintiff withdraws. In 1226 a lord who has granted pasture everywhere, 'ubique,' and has inclosed part of it, succumbs in a suit against his tenant, and we are led to suppose that if the qualification 'ubique' had been absent, his right of approvement would have been maintained. It must be noticed, however, that the marginal note in Bracton's Notedoes not lay stress on the 'ubique,' and regards the decision as contrary to the law subsequently laid down by the Constitution of Merton. In a case of 1292 one of the counsel for the defendant took it for granted that the Statute of Merton altered the previously existing common law. The language of the Statutes themselves is certainly in favour of such a construction: in the Merton Constitution it is stated as a fact that the English magnates were prevented from making use of their manors, and the Westminster Statute. Is as positive as to neighbours; 'multi domini hucusque... impediti extiterunt,' etc. It seems hardly possible to doubt that the enactments really represent a new departure, although the way towards it had been prepared by the collision of interests in open Court. The condition negatively indicated by the documents in regard to the time before these enactments cannot be dismissed by the consideration that the lord would derogate from his grant by approving. Although a single trial may bear directly on the relation between the lord and only one of the tenants or a few of them, every change in the occupation of the land touches all those who are members of the manorial community. The removal of difficulties as to approvement was, before the Statute of Merton, not a question of agreement between two persons, but a question as to the relative position of the lord and of the whole body of the tenantry. The lord might possibly settle with every tenant singly, but it seems much more probable that he brought the matter, when it arose, before the whole body with which the management of the village husbandry rested, that is, before the halimote, with its free and unfree tenants. In any case, the influence of the free tenants as recognised by the common law was decisive, and hardly to be reconciled with the usual feudal notions as to the place occupied by the lord in the community. It must be noted that even that order of things which came into being in consequence of the Statute contains an indirect testimony as to the power of the village community. The Act requires the pasture left to the free tenants to be sufficient, and it may be asked at once, what criterion was there of such a sufficiency, if the number of beasts was not mentioned in the instrument by which the common was held. Of course, in case of dispute, a jury had to give a verdict about it, but what had the jury to go by? It was not the actual number of heads of cattle on a tenement that could be made the starting-point of calculation. Evidently the size of the holding, and its relation to other holdings, had to be taken into account. But if so, then the legal admeasurement had to conform to the customary admeasurement defined by the community. And so again the openly recognised law of the kingdom had to be set in action according to local customs, which in themselves had no legally binding force.
Besides the land regularly used for pasture, the cattle of the village were sent grazing along the r and in the woods. These last were mostly used for feeding swine. In other respects, also, the wood was subjected to a treatment analogous to that of the pasture land. The right of hunting was, of course, subjected to special regulations, which have to be discussed from the point of view of forest law. But, apart from that right, the wood was managed by the village community according to certain customary rules. Every tenant had a right to fell as many young trees as he wanted to keep his house and his hedges in order. It sometimes happens, that the lord and the homage enter into agreement as to the bigger trees, and for every trunk taken by the lord the tenantry are entitled to take its equivalent. Whenever the right had to be apportioned more or less strictly, the size of the holdings was always the main consideration.
It would be strange to my purpose to discuss the details of common of estovers, of turbary, or of fishery. The chief points which touch upon the problems of social origins are sufficiently apparent in the subject of pasture. The results of our investigation may, I think, be summed up under the following heads: --
1. Rights of common are either a consequence of the communal husbandry of the manor, or else they proceed from special agreement or long use.
2. The legal arrangement of commons depends on a customary arrangement, in which free and unfree tenants take equal part.
3. The feudal theory of the lord's grant is insufficient to explain the different aspects assumed by rights of common, and especially the opposition between lord and free commoners.
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